This essay will discuss how the foreign policy of the post-independence Irish Free State, 1922-1948, was defined by its relationship with its former imperial master, Great Britain. It shows how the pro treaty majority party, Cumann na nGaedheal, utilised its ‘freedom to provide freedom’ to augment Ireland’s dominion status through the conduit of the League of Nations and the Imperial Conferences of the Commonwealth. Subsequently, it addresses, post 1932, the more antagonistic policies of Eamonn de Valera and the Fianna Fail Government relating to the ‘economic war’, the 1937 Constitution, and the deletion of the Oath of Allegiance to the British Crown. It, also, demonstrates the near unanimous support of the Irish people during WW II for a policy of neutrality and not entering the war in support of Britain. Finally, it shows how the Inter-Party Government of1948, led by Fine Gael’s John A. Costello, declared a long aspired for Republic and the ramifications of that decision.
Before addressing Post 1922 Irish Foreign Policy decisions it would be valid to look at past legacies which informed the tenets of post-independence Irish Foreign Policy. While Kennedy and Skelly claim that “the history of Ireland since 1916 is in many respects the history of Irish foreign policy”,[1] Fanning goes further back, contending that the tenets of Irish Foreign Policy (including neutrality) evolved prior to the creation of the Irish Free State as an autonomous polity within the British Commonwealth. The Irish tendency of canvassing the support of Britain’s of Britain’s international enemies, dates back to the nineteenth century and earlier. The primary reason for Irish antagonism was and is geographic. Ireland is a smaller and weaker offshore island behind a stronger and more powerful neighbour (See additional details).[2] As the twentieth century progressed, the traditional policy of Irish nationalism allying itself with Britain’s enemies, pragmatically moderated to one of neutrality, which was seen as a proclamation of Independence.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of
December 1921 legislated for the creation of an Irish Free State, as a
self- governing Dominion within the British Commonwealth, rather than the
republic that was fought for since 1916 and before. Following a decision
to accept the terms of the agreement, an incestuous Civil War ensued,
ironically, on an objection to an Oath of Allegiance to the British Crown
rather than on the issue of partition which was later to become a corner
stone of Irish Foreign Policy.
Post-Independence Irish Foreign Policy was conducted, Tonra wrote,
according to the narrative of the Irish Nation. Within this story, history
was extensively defined in British terms. Thus, the new State’s initial
foreign policy priorities focused on establishing the exact correlation
between the embryonic Irish Free State and the British Empire.[3]
From its foundation, the foreign policy of the Irish Free State was shaped
to fit the requirements of this narrative, with, initially, a particular
emphasis on undermining the perceived constitutional ambiguity relating to
its assertions of independence. It was imperative that the Irish State
should be enabled to distinguish itself from being viewed as an English
dependency.[4]
To
this end, in order to promote assertions of independence and a separate
national identity, Irish Foreign Policy focused on passports, flying own
flag at sea and creating a diplomatic service. It was, also, a priority,
due to the fractured essence of the State’s foundation which qualified the
allegiance of a significant amount of citizens, to reinterpret its
affinity to the British Crown and abolish constitutional equivocation to
independence. In order to further the expression of independence from
Britain, the policy was intent on validating the State’s legitimacy
abroad. This, it contended, would assist domestic legitimacy if perceived
to be a valued and energetic associate of the international community of
nations. Finally, it intended to protect and vindicate the honour of the
state. This would be achieved by defending the country and its people from
external invasion. Furthermore, pertaining to the partition of the island,
the policy committed to pursuing the unification of the national
territory.[5]
Anti-Treaty
antagonists, who constituted a large minority of the population,
considered the policy to be a false representation. Thus, External Affairs
was undoubtedly the most significant governmental department of whose
international position was disputed. Cumann na nGaedheal, which ruled for
the first decade of the new state, maintained, as Michael Collins did,
that the Treaty provided ‘freedom to achieve freedom’. It wanted to
portray that the status of dominion need not deter a country from
expressing its independence and that it was not inferior to Britain in
matters of international affairs.[6]
Gavan Duffy,
the first Minister for External Affairs, did not trust England and he
feared the Commonwealth, which was undoubtedly under the imprimatur of
Westminster. His initial goal was membership of the League of Nations
which he believed would provide Ireland with a platform to propagate her
sovereign freedom.[7]
On joining, President Cosgrave, in his inaugural speech at its Geneva
Assembly, September 1923, emphasised that Ireland joined the League not as
a Dominion but as ‘Soarstat Eireann...a fully self-governing state’[8].
Shortly
afterwards, the Irish Free State attended its first Imperial Conference,
in late 1923. These Conferences were viewed, as ‘the chief buttress of
imperial unity and the tangible expression of imperial co-operation’.[9]
The Irish delegation made little contribution, other than urging support
for the League’s values as a footing for Commonwealth collaboration in
foreign policy. It was, however, a valuable reconnaissance which was put
to good stead, as accomplishments in 1926 and 1929 testify.[10]
The
League was appreciated by the Free State: membership represented an
assurance and a declaration of its independent nationhood. Geneva was a
more neutral environment, not conducive to unwelcome Commonwealth
influences, where the Irish could play a more independent role.
Membership, also, provided an important sense of security for an Ireland
so recently departed from British domination. However, there was another
agenda: the Free State indicated a desire to catalogue the Anglo-Irish
Treaty as an international agreement under Article 18 of the Covenant. The
action was opposed by Britain who asserted that the Treaty was an
inter se agreement within the
Commonwealth. This action exemplified a declaration of independent
Dominion action and an expectation that the Irish Free State envisaged
recognition as a treaty-making state rather a mere supplementary of Great
Britain. The Treaty was registered, by the League, on11 July 1924 to the
annoyance of Britain.[11]
This year also saw a further expansion of the state’s independent
identity, with the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary to
Washington, on this occasion with the approval of Britain. In addition to
its own diplomats, the Irish claimed its own citizenship, its own
passports and its own flag. However, Free State passports, first issued in
April 1924, failed to include the words ‘British Subject’ as insisted by
Britain and were not recognised by the Foreign Office depriving holders of
security in areas without Free State representation.[12]
There were problems relating to the flying of the Irish Tricolour at sea,
which required a change in imperial shipping legislation to rectify.
Despite vigorous engagement by the Free State at the 1926 Imperial
Conference, it was not until 1929 that the concept of shared recognition
of dominion merchant shipping was assented to, permitting Irish ships to
fly the national flag.[13]
However,
perpetuating a vigorous Irish Nation Narrative demanded more than
embassies, flags and passports – issues that only seemed exemplify the
limited nature of Irish independence. In 1926 the Free State, despite
opposition from Britain, put itself forward for election to the council of
the League. While unsuccessful, they were happy with their resulting
support.[14]
They had to wait until 1930 to mount a successful campaign.
1926, also,
saw an Imperial Conference in London. The Irish delegation was ostensibly
led by Minister for External Affairs Desmond Fitzgerald but its agenda was
propagated by the more forceful Minister for Justice Kevin O Higgins. The
Free State was until now an uncharted entity on the world stage. Sensitive
of their recent independence, mocked by opponents at home as a British
subordinate, they highlighted anomalies and anachronisms of the colonial
epoch which they believed undermined their sovereignty and sustained their
antagonists. The British Government and its monarch continued to be
embedded in the structure of the state.[15]
The ambition was to achieve co-equality with Britain in matters of foreign
affairs and to see ‘that these nations known as Dominions were full
sovereign States, exercising the full rights of sovereign States in the
world’.[16]
The final Conference Report (Balfour Declaration) declared that Dominions
are ‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect
of their domestic or external affairs’.[17]
However, in his conclusion, the Committee chairman was to differentiate
between equality of ‘status’ and equality of ‘function’.[18]
Thus, Britain was to retain supremacy in the sphere of diplomacy and
defence.
In August
1928, President Cosgrave signed the Treaty for the Renunciation of War.
The significance of this agreement was that it was the first occasion that
Dominions inscribed separately, their signature assenting only to their
own area of jurisdiction. This restriction equally pertained to Great
Britain.[19]
The following year, the Irish Free State, became the solitary Dominion to
sign without reservation, Article 36 - the ‘Optional Clause’ – of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. This Clause compelled member
states to tender their international disagreements to the obligatory
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, a prerequisite which the Commonwealth
believed might run counter to
inter se agreements between
Dominions.[20]
The Committee
on the Operation of Dominion Legislation 1929 acknowledged what was
already an accepted entitlement when it ‘declared and enacted that the
Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws having
extra-territorial operation’.[21]
It, furthermore asserted that laws enacted by the Westminster Parliament
may no longer be imposed on any Dominion, except at the request and
sanction of that Dominion.[22]
The Free State arrived at the 1930 Imperial Conference of1930 with an
agenda: to legitimise the accomplishments of 1929, to formally document
the progress of ten years, and to absolve previous dissentions through a
cooperative constitutional agreement. There were also some additional
items outside of the O.D.L. Report that they wished to address, including
the Appeal to the Judicial Committee and the Oath of Allegiance. While the
Irish did not succeed in removing all anomalies, they hoped these may be
addressed during the period of time before the Statute would become law
and, thus, recommended the 1930 Conference Report.[23]
The year 1931 concluded
with the proclamation of the Statute of Westminster, a Bill affording
statuary provision to an epoch of Commonwealth evolvement; the previous
decade of which had been characterised by appreciable Irish effort. The
Irish Free State had been unstinting in its determination to deter the
British Government from having an input in the statutory business of the
Dominions and had contributed generously to the development of the Statute
from 1926 onwards. The Irish, further, hoped that the last vestiges of
official involvement would be erased prior to the enacting of the
legislation. This, however, did not materialise. The Cumann na nGaedheal
Government advised the British, to no avail, that the removal of the Oath
of Allegiance was a significant political topic in Ireland and failure to
remove it would lead to the election of Eamonn De Valera and a Fianna Fail
Government. The Oath was not deleted and the forecast was validated.[24]
Within days of
coming to power De Valera brought forward a Bill to abolish the Oath of
Allegiance, in addition to deleting the passage in the 1922 Constitution
which specified that any requirement of the constitution incompatible with
the Treaty was invalid. He also contested a number of significant
remittances to Britain, leading to, what was termed, a six year ‘economic
war’. The word ‘economic’ may be a misnomer because the dispute also
pertained to political, constitutional and defence concerns.[25]
The new government demanded the retention of land annuity payments,
elimination of the office of Governor General, deletion of the entitlement
of judicial appeal to the Privy Council and the restoration of the
‘supposed’ Treaty-Ports from British military governance.[26]
However, significant
constitutional difficulties remained unanswered prior to the drafting of a
new constitution in the spring of 1935. The synopsis of the document
conferred the sovereignty of the state exclusively in the Irish people,
without recognition of the Anglo-Irish Treaty or the state’s dominion
status. The state was only to be associated with the Commonwealth through
international relations, referenced by a component of standard
legislation. This was to result in the adoption of De Valera’s
long-championed concept of ‘external association’ which he had originally
proposed in preference to the 1921 Treaty.[27]
The new constitution was approved by referendum in July 1937 and was
enacted into law by the close of the year. Some months later the six-year
disagreement concluded allowing Ireland and Britain to sign a new
Anglo-Irish treaty. The economic disagreement was resolved and the 1921
Treaty ports were restored unconditionally, paving the way for the
adoption of Irish neutrality the following year. Unfortunately, for De
Valera, there was no satisfactory outcome pertaining to partition.[28]
Surprisingly, Ireland did not formally declare a Republic. Holding back,
De Valera believed, retained an important political connection to Northern
Ireland.
From the time Fianna
Fail first entered the Dail in 1927 De Valera championed a policy of
neutrality, when he stated ‘that if there were to be another Imperial
war...it is the wish of the Irish people to be neutral in that war’.[29]
This policy was further buttressed consequent to the failure of the League
of Nations, when he opined that henceforth neutrality was the most
judicious policy for small states.[30]
The handing back of the Treaty-Ports was the prerequisite to Irish
neutrality. The result of that arrangement, according to de Valera, was to
transfer to the Irish State overall administration of these safeguards,
and thus and acknowledge and institute Irish sovereignty over the twenty
six counties and its territorial waters.[31]
De Valera prioritised the pre-eminence of sovereignty over neutrality, as
his principal political ambition. This was accounted for by the fact that
a dedication to the latter was effectively a by-product of a preoccupation
with the former.[32]
Thus, F.S.L. Lyons contended that Irish neutrality during World War 11
‘was the outward and visible sign of absolute sovereignty’.[33]
Ireland’s
neutrality as practiced during this period had the overwhelming support of
the Irish people and mirrored a virtual complete lack of public support
for participation in the war. The only political figure to propagate Irish
involvement was James Dillon T.D. and he only appeared above the parapet
after the United States’ enforced involvement.[34]
Garret
Fitzgerald, whose writings generally indicate a personal predilection for
Irish collaboration with the Allies, enumerated the reasons for Ireland’s
neutrality. Firstly, it was an assertion of sovereignty. Secondly, there
was a dread of participation in the hostilities, particularly bombardment
from the air. Thirdly, and probably most pertinent, was a fear that
involvement on the side of the Allies, (essentially Britain) only sixteen
years after the end of an incestuous civil war fought on the Anglo-Irish
Treaty may lead to the reigniting of domestic unrest.[35]
There was another reason, as enunciated by the Secretary of the Department
of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe in1941: ‘Small nations like Ireland do
not and cannot assume the role of defenders of just causes except their
own’.[36]
Fianna Fail’s Post War policy did not deliberately embrace isolationism.
In 1946 Ireland applied for membership of the United Nations, only to have
its application vetoed by the Soviet Union. Soviet justification pointed
to the lack of a diplomatic relations with the USSR, in addition to Irish
wartime neutrality, although a more convincing explanation was probably
that Ireland was seen as pro-American. Consequent to the failed attempt to
join the UN (in addition to a later decision not to participate in NATO)
Irish foreign policy returned to the conventional issues of Anglo-Irish
relations and partition.[37]
After sixteen
years in power, the Fianna Fail government fell in February 1948. The new
inter-party administration, led by Fine Gael, propagated a sustained
campaign against partition. De Valera freed from the trappings of office,
visited Britain, the United States and Australia emphasising the
immorality of partition. The newly elected inter-party government,
determined not to be outdone initiated its own international
anti-partition campaign.[38]
Taoiseach John A. Costello promised to impact on Britain’s ‘pride,
prestige and pocket’ until the demise of partition.[39]
Costello was not a proponent of the ambiguity in the External Relations
Act. While visiting Canada in September of that year, to the amazement of
his hosts, Costello declared that the External Relations Act would be
repealed and, additionally, that Ireland would be exiting the
Commonwealth. In November, he introduced the Republic of Ireland Bill in
the Dail, featuring a reciprocal agreement with Britain and the
Commonwealth for citizenship and trade functions.[40]
According to the 1948 British Nationality Act, citizens of the new
Republic were not declared aliens and maintained residential and voting
entitlements.
However there were other repercussions, on May of the following year
Britain issued its own Ireland Bill, which affirmed that Northern Ireland
(or any part thereof) would never exit the United Kingdom without the
imprimatur of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, thus, relocating the
prohibition on Irish unity from Westminster to Belfast.
In conclusion,
this essay has shown how Irish Policy was a central expression of national
Independence from Britain. Subsequent to the passing of the Treaty, the
Cosgrave administration laboured, through the conduit of the League of
Nations and successive Imperial Conferences, to expand Ireland’s
independence. With the election of Fianna Fail in 1932 the same narrative
continued but in a more antagonistic manner, leading to the Irish
Nationality Bill 1935, the External Relations Bill 1936 and the
ratification of a new Constitution by the Irish people in 1937. Neutrality
in World War II, supported by the vast majority of all political
persuasions, further emphasised Ireland’s independence from Britain.
Following the defeat of Fianna Fail in the General Election of 1948, the
Fine Gael led Inter-Party Government under Costello
declared a Republic and removed Ireland from the Commonwealth, ironically,
fortifying partition.
[1] Michael Kennedy and Skelly, Joseph Morrison, “The Study of Irish
Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism, in M. Kennedy
and J.M. Skelly Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to
Internationalism, (Four
Courts Press, Dublin, 2000) p. 13
[2]
Ronan Fanning, Irish Neutrality: A Historical Review,
Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1982) p. 27
[3]
Ben Torna. Global Citizen and
the European Republic. (Manchester 2006) P.16
[4]
Ibid. p.22
[5]
Ibid. p. 22
[6]
Conor Cruise O’ Brien, ‘Ireland in International Affairs’, in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed)
Conor Cruise O’ Brien
introduces Ireland (London 1969)
p.106
[7]
D. W.Harkness,
The Restless Dominion,
(Gill & Macmillan Dublin 1969) p.31-32
[8]
Constitution of Irish Free State, Article 2
[9]
P.N.S. Mansergh,
Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-9, p.34
[10]
Harkness,
The Restless Dominion, pp.
37, 55,
[11]
Ibid. pp. 55-63.
[12]
Ibid. pp. 55, 56, 70.
[13]
Tonra, Global Citizen and European Republic, p. 23
[14]
Telegram, Irish Free State Delegation to Department External Affairs, 17
September 1926 ‘recieved’ (Fitzgerald Papers.)
[15]
Harkness,
The Restless Dominion,
p.86.
[16]
Dail Eireann debates, XVI, col. 259. (Fitzgerald)
[17]
Cmd. 2768, 1926: Imperial Conference, 1926. Summary of Proceeding. P.
13
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Harkness,
Restless Dominion, pp.
140-141.
[20]
Ibid. pp. 141-142.
[21]
Cmd. 3479, 1929-30,
Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion
Legislation and Merchant
Shipping Legislation,
1922 p.17.
[22]
Harkness,
The Restless Dominion, p.
159.
[23]
Ibid. pp.176, 228.
[24]
Ibid. p 229-239.
[25]
Deirdre McMahon,
Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, p.156.
[26]
Tonra,
Global Citizen, and European Republic, p. 25.
[27]
Ibid. p. 25-26.
[28]
McMahon, Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948 in Judith M.
Brown and W.R. Louis (eds)
The Oxford History of the British Empire; Twentieth Century
Vol. 4 (Oxford History of the British Empire S.) pp. 156-157.
[29]
Dail Debates, XXVII, cols. 430-502: November 21 1928.
[30]
Dail Debates, LXII, cols. 2649-2746: June 18 1936.
[31]
Maurice Moynihan (ed.),
Speeches and Statements of Eamonn de Valera 1917-73, (Dublin and New York 1980) p. 34
[32] Fanning, Irish Neutrality; p. 30.
[33]
F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, (London, 1973 ed.) p. 554.
[34]
Garret Fitzgerald. Irish Times, May 6 1995.
[35]
Garret Fitzgerald. The Origins and Present Status of Irish
‘Neutrality’.
Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 9 (1998) p.14
[36]
Joseph Walshe to John Hearne, 1 January 1941, quoted in Keogh,
Ireland and Europe 1919-1989, p.119
[37]
John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, ed.
Politics of the Republic of Ireland. (Routledge, London and New York, 2005) p.434
[38]
Ibid. p. 29.
[39]
Dail Debate, 115: 807
[40] Dail Debates, CXIII,
cols.380-83. 24 Nov. 1948.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
- Cmd. 2769, 1926: Imperial Conference 1926. Summary of Proceedings
- Cmd. 3479, 1929-30: Report of the Conference on the Opperation of Dominion Legistlation and Marine and Shipping Legistlation 1922.
- Constitution of Irish Free State (Article 2)
- Dail Debate, XVI, col. 259. (Fitzgerald)
- Dail Debate, XXVII, cols. 430-502. November 21 1928. (de Valera)
- Dail Debate, LXII, cols. 2649-2746. June 18 1936. (de Valera)
- Dail Debate, 115: 807 (Costello)
- Dail Debate, cols. 380-83. 24 November 1948 (Costello)
- Garret Fitzgerald, Irish Times May 6 1995
- Telegram, Irish Free State Delegation to Department of External Affairs, 17 September 1926, (Fitzgerald Papers)
- Walshe, Joseph, to John Hearne, quoted in Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1989. P.119
Secondary Sources
- Coakley, John and Michael Gallagher, (ed,) Politics of the Republic of Ireland, (Routledge, London and New York, 2005)
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- Fitzgerald, Garret, The Origins and Present Status of Irish Neutrality, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 9, (1998) pp. 11-19.
- Harkness, D.W. The Restless Dominion, (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1969)
- Kennedy, Michael and J.M. Skelly, The Study of Irish Foreign Policy from Independence to Internationalism, in M.Kennedt and J.M. Skelly, Irish Foreign Policy 1919-1966: From Independence to Internationalism. (Four Court Press, 2000)
- Lyons, F.S.L. Ireland since the Famine. (London 1973)
- Mansergh, P.N.S. Survey of Commonwealth Affairs. 1931-39. (Oxford 1952)
- McMahon, Deirdre, Ireland and the Empire Commonwealth 1900-1948, in Judith M. Brown and W.R. Louis (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire: Twentieth Century Vol. 4 (Oxford History of the British Empire S.) pp. 139-162.
- Moynihan, Maurice. Speeches and Statements of Eamonn de Valera 1917-73. (Dublin and New York 1980)
- O’Brien, Conor Cruise, Ireland in International Affairs, in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed,) Conor Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland, (London 1969) pp.104-134.
- Tonra, Ben, Global Citizen and the European Republic, (Manchester 2006)
- Tonra, Ben, et al (ed.) Irish Foreign Policy, (Gill and Macmillan 2012)
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